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Whatever Made You Think I Was Consenting:
A Proposal to Silence Patriarchal Influence in
Civil Sexual Assault Cases
by Mary Ellen Le-tniettx*
In May 1984 Starlyn Watts called the Sunnyvale Department of
Public Safety to request assistance in resolving a domestic dispute with
her husband. Officer David Birgers responded to the call and attempted
unsuccessfully to persuade Mrs. Watts' husband to leave the house to
"cool off." Acting on Officer Birgers' suggestion, Mrs. Watts left her
horne with her two children, a four year old and an infant, and checked
into a motel in nearby Santa Clara, California. The Officer gave Mrs.
Watts his business card and requested that she call the Department to tell
them where she was staying. Although Mrs. Watts telephoned the
Department early in the evening and left a message for Officer Birgers,
he did not return her call until he was about to go off duty at 12:30 a.m ..
According to Mrs. Watts, the Officer told her he was going to corne by
to make sure she was "all right."
Officer Birgers arrived at Mrs. Watts' motel room and she let him in
believing he was acting in his capacity as a police officer. After
engaging in small talk, Officer Birgers attempted to fondle and kiss Mrs.
Watts. MrsWatts protested, telling the Officer "No" and got up from
the bed where she was sitting. A few minutes later, Mrs. Watts again
sat down on the same bed as the Officer, but farther away from him and
closer to her daughter Deanne who was sleeping in the next bed.
Birgers approached Mrs. Watts again but this time was more persistent.
Although she verbally protested and tried to push Birgers away a second
time, the Officer ignored Mrs. Watts protests, forced her down onto the
bed, and proceeded to have sexual intercourse with Mrs. Watts. After
Birgers ejaculated he got up and left stating that "next time it would be
without the kids."
At trial, Officer Birgers testified that he interpreted Mrs. Watts'
actions as nervousness and that her mild resistance was merely intended
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to slow him down, but not to stop him. Birgers further testified that he
believed that from Mrs. Watts' "body language" and from "the
atmosphere" in the room, she was consenting.
Mrs. Watts revealed the incident only to her mother, husband and
psychiatrist, and barricaded hel"self in her home. When she began to
experience genital sores, she went to the Stanford University Hospital
for medical treatment and diagnosis. In response to hospital
questioning, Mrs. Watts revealed that she had been sexually assaulted
several months earlier, and the hospital personnel contacted the police.
The District Attorney's office for Santa Clara County declined to bring
charges against Birgers, although after an undisclosed internal affairs
investigation following Mrs. Watts' report of the incident, Birgers
subsequently resigned from the Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety.
Mrs. Watts contacted Greg Ward, a former U.S. Attorney,
indicating that she wanted to bring suit against Birgers. On behalf of
Mrs. Watts and her daughter Deanne, Ward filed claims for sexual
assault and battery, 1 negligent infliction of emotional distress, and for
violations of plaintiffs' civil rights under color of law against Birgers.
Against the City Of Sunnyvale, Ward filed claims for the negligent
supervision and training of Birgers, as well as for vicarious liability
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
In January, 1989, the case was tried before the Honorable William
J. Fernandez, a Superior Court Judge in San Jose, California. During
the trial, the judge allowed numerous references to Mrs. Watts' alleged
sexual conduct with individuals other than the defendant in violation of
California Evidence Code sections 11062 and 783. 3 Moreover,

1. Questo v. Birgers, No. 573185 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. filed April 23, 1985).
2. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1106 (West Supp. 1990), in pertinent part reads:
(a) In any civil action alleging conduct which constitutes sexual
harassment, sexual assault, or sexual battery, opinion evidence, reputation
evidence, and evidence of specific instances of plaintiff's sexual conduct, or any
of such evidence is not admissable by the defendant in order to prove consent by
the plaintiff or the absence of injury to the plaintiff ....
Despite this code section, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion ad limine, stating
that he needed to observe the evidence as it was presented at trial. Record at 13-14, Questo
(No. 573185). The court's reluctance to limit inquiry into sexual conduct undoubtedly
stemmed from its view that "sexual liaisons do not happen in a vacuum. They happen
because of inducements, blandishments, suggestions and so forth .... " Id. at 122. The
court went on to state that the purpose of § 1106 is "to protect the person that's raped,
somebody that doesn't know the perpetrator of the rape." Id. at 123. Since it is a
"different story when you have people that know each other," the court directed that "we're
going to have to hear about the blandishments of opportunity and the scent of sexual
flavor that a person may exude." Id.
3. CAL. EVID. CODE § 783 (West Supp. 1990), in pertinent part, reads:
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Fernandez refused to allow expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome
to "disabus[e] the jury of some widely held misconceptions about rape
and rape victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of constraints
of popular myths.,,4 This denial was juxtaposed with defense counsel's
opening Gemtnents to the jury that its job wonld be "to decide whether
Starlyn Watts' conduct, after the incident on May the 28th, 1984, is
consistent with that of a victim of a violent assault."5 In closing
argument, counsel attacked Mrs. Watts' prior acquaintance with the
Officer, her seemingly passive conduct in the motel room, and her
apparent friendliness to the Officer afterwards, arguing that she "was
not comporting herself like a violent rape victim, someone who has been
In any civil action alleging conduct which constitutes sexual harassment,
sexual assault, or sexual battery, if evidence of sexual conduct of the plaintiff is
offered to attack credibility of the plaintiff ... , the following procedures shall
be followed:
(a) A written motion shall be made by the defendant to the court and the
plaintiff's attorney stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the relevancy
of evidence of the sexual conduct of the plaintiff proposed to be presented ....
(c) If the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient, the court shall order
a hearing out of the presence of the jury ....
(d) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that evidence
proposed to be offered by the defendant regarding the sexual conduct of the
plaintiff is relevant pursuant to Section 780, and is not inadmissible pursuant to
Section 352 [prejudice outweighs probative], the court may make an order
stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant. .. 's objections.
4. Record at 482-84, 490-91,1132-33, Questo (No. 573185). Mrs. Watts' counsel was
not attempting to present expert opinion that she was suffering from rape trauma
syndrome. In People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450
(1984), the California Supreme Court found that testimony as to the whether the victim
suffered rape trauma syndrome was improper, constituting evidence that a rape in fact
occurred. The court recognized, however, that expert testimony "may play a particularly
useful role by disabusing the jury of some widely held misconceptions about rape and rape
victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of popular myths." Id.
at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
5. Record at 101, Questo (No. 573185).
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violated and demeaned," and asked the jury to find she consented based
on this conduct. 6
Prior to jury deliberations, Judge Fernandez instructed the jury that
it was a complete defense to an action for battery or intentional infliction
of emotional distress if Officer Birgers proved he had a reasonable good
faith belief that Mrs. Watts consented to sexual intercourse. 7 Such an
instruction is allowable in a criminal prosecution for rape, 8 but misstates
the civil standard.
In civil tort law, a battery is an intentional harmful or offensive
touching that a reasonable person would find offensive. 9 Pursuant to
the majority view, the intent required by the defendant is merely the
intent to do the act that causes the harm and not the intent to cause the
harm to the plaintiff. 1o Consent under the civil standard may be explicit,
6.Id. at 1304. In People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45,
50 (1985), the appellate court found that expert testimony touching on a victim's
response to an assault is:
Authorized by Bledsoe to permit rehabilitation of a complainant's
credibility [where it] is limited to discussion of victims as a class, supported by
references to literature and experience (such as an expert normally relies upon)
and does not extend to discussion and diagnosis of the witness in the case at
hand.
7. The jury was instructed as follows:
It is a defense to a charge of battery and/or intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on an act of sexual intercourse that the defendant
entertained a reasonable and good faith belief that the female person voluntarily
consented to engage in sexual intercourse. The defendant has the burden of proof
by a preponderance of the evidence of establishing that he reasonably and in
good faith believed that the female person voluntarily consented to engage in
sexual intercourse. If from all the evidence you believe that a reasonable and
good faith belief that the female person voluntarily consented to engage in an
act of sexual intercourse you must find the defendant not liable for battery and/or
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Record at 1359-60, Questo (No.
573185).
8. In People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 155, 542 P.2d 1337,1345, 125 Cal. Rptr.
745, 753 (1975), the California Supreme Court held that a defendant's mistaken belief as
to consent is a complete defense in some circumstances, even though the victim did not
actually consent to the conduct.
Under [Mayberry], a defendant who entertains both a reasonable and bona
fide belief that the victim voluntarily consent[ed] to engage in the sexual offense
does not have the necessary wrongful intent to be convicted of the crime. The
rationale is simple: one who labors under a mistake of fact that negates the
existence of any criminal intent cannot be convicted of a crime.
People v. May, 213 Cal. App. 3d 118, 261 Cal. Rptr 502 (1989) (quoting People v.
Castillo, 193 Cal. App. 3d 119, 124, 238 Cal. Rptr. 207, 210 rev. denied, 47 Cal. 3d 344
(1987) (citations omitted».
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965).
10. Reynolds, Tortious Battery: Is "I Didn't Mean Any Harm" Relevant?, 37 OKLA. L.
REV. 717, 718 (1984). The California Bar Association Jury Instruction § 7.51 (1986)
states: A battery is any intentional, unlawful and harmful [or offensive] contact by one
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such as an express verbal agreement, or it may be apparent, such as is
implied by the plaintiff's "[v]oluntary participation or acquiescence in
acts otherwise amounting to an intentional tort ... ."11 Apparent
consent is found "when the words or acts or silence or inaction, would
be understood by a reasonable person as intended to indicate consent
and they are in fact so understood by the other."12 "On the other hand,
if a reasonable person would not understand from the words or conduct
that consent is given even though [the defendant] honestly so believes;
there is then no apparent consent."13
In the Watts' trial, the jury returned an eleven-to-one verdict in favor
of defendant Birgers. Despite a composition of eight women and four
men, the jury objected to Mrs. Watts' inadequate protestations which
they believed gave Officer Birgers a reasonable good faith belief that
Mrs. Watts consented. 14 Mrs. Watts' appeal is currently pending. 1s
It is unclear whether Starlyn Watts' experience is typical as there are
no statistics available pertaining specifically to civil sexual assault
plaintiffs. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Watts' experience at trial as a
rape victim was typical. She was assaulted by someone she had met
previously, if only briefly. She told the defendant "No" and that refusal
was ignored. Fearing the defendant would harm her sleeping children,
Mrs. Watts put up little struggle in order to get "it" over with quickly so
that the defendant would leave. Mrs. Watts waited several months
before informing the authorities, and then only after being diagnosed
with genital herpes.
The district attorney looked at Mrs. Watts' case with a somewhat
less than enthusiastic eye. It was almost a textbook "bad facts" case that
would come squarely up against every juror prejudice and one that could
eventually put Mrs. Watts' character on trial. 16 Moreover, Birgers was
a police officer, a defendant affiliated with a whole department of
professional witnesses essential to the district attorney's successful
prosecution of other cases. Consequently, the D.A.'s decision not to
bring charges is not surprising.
person with the person of another. The intent necessary to constitute battery is not an
intent to cause harm, but an intent to do the act which causes the harm.
11. 5 B.WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS § 271 (9th ed.1988).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 comment c (1979).
13.ld. (emphasis added).
14. Clerk's Transcript at 232, Questo (No. 573185).
15. Id. at 235.
16. Cf. Note, Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Conduct: A Proposal For The
Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399 (1988).
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The bitterest pill in Mrs. Watts' experience, however, was that the
evidentiary safeguards put in place by the legislature 17 failed to protect
Mrs. Watts from the very prejudices to which she was ultimately
subjected. The conclusion to be drawn is frightening: despite
legislative refonns in both criminal and civil law, victims of ~\lal
assault are still subjected to societal prejudice which calls into question
the victim's credibility. This note briefly addresses the evolving trend
of sexual assault victims to pursue civil remedies and the uniquely
problematic issue of defending against a consent defense in a civil
sexual assault case. It further explores the influence of patriarchy and
law as ideologies on the issue of sexual assault and why it continues to
be a volatile subject between the sexes. Lastly, this note proposes that
the reasonable person standard be abandoned and a reasonable woman
standard adopted so that justice is measured not against the ideological
myth of the reasonable man, but by the reasonableness of a woman's
story against feminine morality. Only by adopting new standards that
depart from traditional methods can patriarchal influence be silenced in
the law.
I.

The Modern Trend to Sue for Civil Remedies
According to Camille LeGrand and Frances Leonard in Civil Suits
for Sexual Assault: Compensating Rape Victims,18 Starlyn Watts'
decision to seek tort damages from David Birgers and the City of
Sunnyvale is part of a rising trend among victims of sexual assault. 19
This trend results from changing societal attitudes toward victims as
well as changes in victims' feelings about themselves. Both factors
have led to an increased number of civil and even criminal sexual assault
complaints. 2o This increase is due in part to the growing tendency of
sexual assault victims to react with anger rather than shame. 21 Anger
leads the victims to the criminal process and frustration over the
apparent inadequacies of the criminal process leads the victims to pursue

17. The Legislative comment to CAL. EVID. CODE §1106 states: "the evidence
introduced by the plaintiff or given by the plaintiff. (d) Nothing in this section shall be
construed to make inadmissible any evidence offered to attack the credibility of the
plaintiff as provided in [California Evidence Code] Section 783."
18.8 GOLDEN GATE V.L. REV. 479 (1979).
19.Id.
20.Id.
21. Id.
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civillitigation. 22 Victims increasingly look to the civil process to obtain
the objectives once thought to be best remedied by a criminal
prosecution. 23 Many women24 sue in order to impress upon the rapist
and society that the offense is grave and to communicate to the rapist the
seriousness of his offense.25 In cases· where the district attorney
declines to bring charges, or where the defendant is not sentenced to
state prison,26 the victims frequently feel dissatisfied with the system27
allegedly protecting their interests, and will bring suit in order to regain
control over their lives. 28
Aside from the psychological vindication a victim may feel,29 there
are other more practical reasons for a victim to pursue tort damages.
For one, a verdict in favor of the plaintiff may be easier to obtain
because the burden of proof is lower. In a criminal action the
prosecution is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a moral
certainty that the defendant raped the complainant. 30 In a civil action,.
the plaintiff need only prove her case by a preponderance of the
evidence. 31 Perhaps even more advantageous, in a criminal action a
conviction of rape requires actual penetration of the victim by the
22.Id.
23. Id. at 480.
24. Admittedly not all victims of sexual assault are women; however, the California
Office of the Attorney General's Bureau of Criminal Statistics and Special Services
estimates that in 1988 11,771 forcible rape crimes were committed, with 82/100,000
women at risk. The Bureau does not keep statistics on the male population at risk. OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL/DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/DIVISION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION AND INFORMATION BRANCH, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN
CALIFORNIA, 1988 140 (1989). In light of the disproportionate number of female victims,
this note will use the female pronoun to refer to victims of sexual assault.
25. LEGRAND & LEONARD, supra note 18, at 480.
26. In 1988, 51.8 % of all forcible rape arrestees were eventually cleared. OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 24, at 146.
27. LEGRAND & LEONARD, supra note 18, at 480.
28. Epstein, Legal Aids, STUDENT LAWYER, Mar. 1988, at 51-52.
29. Addressing the award of damages in assault and battery cases, Professor Jerome Hall
noted
[assault and battery cases] are intentional aggressions which usually imply
moral culpability, and almost always stimulate resentment .... In this type of
harm the law of torts frequently functions as a punitive apparatus-the "fine"
going to the injured victim of the aggression, and many of the cases that defy
explanation on other grounds can be understood as preferences to impose
substantial judgments rather than the nominal penalties provided by the criminal
law. . .. [Moreover, t]he civil judgment is an authoritative vindication of the
injured person's rights. Besides [s]he is here not dependent on the public
authorities for prosecution and [s]he remains master of the proceedings.
Hall, Interrelations o/Criminal Law and Torts: II, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 967, 977 (1943).
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (West 1985).
31. CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1966).
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rapist. 32 A civil verdict for sexual assault or battery,33 on the other
hand, requires only harmful or offensive touching and includes a wider
"range of unwanted sexual contact including criminal rape, . . .
attempted ... rap[e], forcible sodomy and oral sex, as well as forcible
intrusion with a foreign objett,,34
Moreover, in the civil context the gravamen of the plaintiff's suit
will not be the assault claim, but rather the plaintiff's emotional or
psychological injury.35 Particularly in the context of attempted sexual
assault-an area where the district attorney is unlikely to file charges, a
plaintiff's successful claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
may provide the greatest allocation of damages.
Finally, a victim of sexual assault may feel compelled to bring suit
because collecting a favorable judgment is more than a mere possibility.
The rapist generally does not fit the stereotypical indigent criminal
defendant who is judgment proof.36 Rapists are found in every sector
of society37 and are likely to have assets available to compensate the
victim. Although insurance money is generally unavailable to
compensate victims,38 the creative plaintiff's attorney may also go after a
"deep pocket" third party defendant who arguably has some
responsibility for the assault. 39 Thus, a successful judgment against
such a defendant sends a strong message to landlords, innkeepers,
universities, gas station owners, and other landowners that inadequate
security precautions are not without their consequences. 40

32. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1988), in pertinent part, reads: "Rape is an act of
sexual intercourse accomplished with a person .... " (emphasis added).
33. The common law has historically treated assault and battery as two distinct causes of
action in tort. In this context the courts and commentators often use the terms
interchangeably. See, e.g., Berger v. So. Pac., 144 Cal. App. 2d 1, 300 P.2d 170 (1956).
A Pullman porter allegedly attempted intercourse with a sleeping passenger and had bodily
contact with her. The court described the act as a "sexual assault."
This note will use the term "sexual assault" to also include all forms of sexual
battery.
34. LEGRAND & LEONARD, supra note 18, at 491. Although lesser forms of criminal
sexual assault exist, many district attorneys are reluctant to bring charges unless the rape
is the "jump-from-the bushes" variety. S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 17-18 (1987).
35. /d. at 491-92.
36. Id. at 484.
37.ld. citing COHEN, The Psychology of Rapists, 3 SEMINARS IN SOCIETY 307 (1971).
38. Despite the availability of home owner's insurance, most policies do not provide
coverage for intentional acts of the policyholder.
39. EpSTEIN, supra note 28, at 51.
40. Cf. O'Hara v. W. Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487
(1977) (allowing cause of action against apartment complex owner who fraudulently
represented apartment security to assault victim); Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp.,
38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P. 2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985) (allowing a cause of action
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II.
The Prevalence of Raising the Consent Issue Only in Civil
Sexual Assault Cases
Despite Lord Matthew Hale's well-known maxim that rape is "an
accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be
defended by the party accused, though innocent,,,41 the difficult
experiences of women who bring criminal rape charges are well
documented. 42 To successfully prosecute the victim's case, the district
attorney must also defend the victim's character.
As LeGrand & Leonard state above, sexual assault victims are
increasingly bringing civil claims for relief because of changing attitudes
in society. 43 One would presume this means that society's view toward
sexual assault victims has softened and that it is rare when the victim
herself is put on trial. Specifically, the reader might assume that by
taking victims out of the criminal arena and pursuing civil remedies, the
issue of the victim's consent would take on lessened importance. In
fact, however, even in the area of civil tort litigation, society has
continued to allow defense lawyers to put on their boxing gloves and go
in for the count against the complainant victim, making an issue out of
her dress, her occupation, her relationship with the defendant, and her
judgment for being in the defendant's proximity. The prejudicial effect
of this practice is readily apparent. Moreover, the absurdity of such
inquiries is revealed when applied to civil battery cases where sexual
assault is not involved.
In Garrett v. Dailey,44 the well-known law school case where the
five-year-old defendant Brian Dailey pulled the chair out from under
Mrs. Garrett as she was sitting down, consent by Mrs. Garrett was not
alleged. Nor was consent addressed in Ghassemieh v. Scajer,45 where
similar events occurred between a teacher and a 13-year-old student.
against hospital that failed to provide adequate security where victim was assaulted in
parking lot).
41. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IV, § 242, 2421 (W. C.
Jones ed. 1916).
42. Cf. S. ESTRICH, supra note 34, at 1-2; Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation:
Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977); Note, The Empirical,

Historical and Legal Case Against the Cautionary Instruction: A Call For Legislative
Reform, 1988 DUKE L.J. 154 (1988).
43. LEGRAND & LEONARD, supra note 18, at 479.
44.46 Wash. 2d 197 (1955) (first appeal); 49 Wash. 2d 499 (1956) (second appeal).
45. 52 Md. App. 31 (Md. Sp. App. 1982).
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Undoubtedly the consent defense was not raised because it was
inconceivable that the plaintiffs would consent to such action.
Moreover, the credibility of the victims was not questioned despite the
arguments that both victims were female and each might have consented
merely because they were in the presence of children at the time.
In Spivey v. Battaglia,46 the female plaintiff, known to be shy, was
permanently paralyzed when a male co-worker gave her an unsolicited
hug. As in the other cases, the issue of consent was never raised by the
defendant, although it is arguable (adopting the rationale apparently
followed by defense counsel in sexual battery cases) that because the
plaintiff was generally known to be passive and was sitting next to the
defendant at the time, she consented to the battery. Similarly, in
Lambertson v. United States,47 the plaintiff was injured when a coworker screamed "boo," pulled the plaintiff's hat over his eyes and
began to ride the plaintiff "piggyback." The plaintiff was injured when
he fell forward and struck his face on some meat hooks on the receiving
dock where he was standing at the time. 48 Despite the apparent intent of
the defendant's actions as a practical joke, the plaintiff's consent, as
evidenced by previous conduct between the two parties, never became
an issue. Finally, in Matheson v. Pearson,49 the plaintiff, a junior high
school maintenance worker, was severely injured after being hit on the
head by a tootsie pop hurled from a second story window by two
students. Although the plaintiff might have been previously
"acquainted" with the boys prior to the incident, was arguably dressed
"provocatively" as a maintenance man, and by working below the
overhead windows at a junior high school might have created an
"atmosphere" inviting the incident, the issue of consent was never
raised, and to do so in the manner commonly employed by defense
counsel in sexual assault and battery cases would have been absurd. In
sexual assault cases, however, the ridiculousness of the practice is
overlooked and the judgmental analysis of the plaintiff's conduct is
accepted practice.

46. 258 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1972).
47. 528 F.2d 441 (2nd cir. 1975).
48.ld.
49. 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980).
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III.
The Impact of the Patriarchal Voice
on the Ideology of Law
For the uninitiated, "patriarchy" is the feminist term used to describe
the phenomenon of male domination in society. The essence of
patriarchy is that the male members of society as a class have greater
power, socially, economically, and politically, than the female members
and have used this power to subordinate and control women. 50
Examples validating this phenomenon abound in society, from the still
pervasive use of the male pronoun and the disparity between male and
female wages,51 to the male domination of corporate power. 52 Despite
the instrumental role of women in society, men continue to be "the locus.
of cultural value.,,53 Whatever their role, so long as exclusively or
predominantly male, it is considered overwhelmingly and morally
important. 54
This disparity in the value of the female contribution to society
versus the male contribution, it is argued, evolves from a distinction
between the female or "domestic" sphere of society and the male or
"public" sphere of society. 55 The domestic sphere refers to "minimal
institutions and modes of activity that are organized immediately around
one or more mothers and their children[.]"56 The public sphere refers to
"activities, institutions, and forms of association that link, rank,
50. K. MILLET, SEXUAL POLITICS 33-34 (1969). For citations to other typical feminist
uses of the term, see Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and T ort,38 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 3, 6 n.7 (1988). Feminists, however, are quick to point out that not every man uses
this power to exploit, disadvantage or undermine women. Id.
51. Working women earn on the average 68 cents for every dollar a man earns. The
Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1987, at B3.
52. Only 2% of all executives are women and only 1% are minorities. The Reuter Bus.
Rep., Feb. 3, 1989, at BC cycle.
53. M.Z. ROSALDO, Women, Culture and Society: A Theoretical Overview, in WOMEN,
CULTURE AND SOCIETY 17,20 (M.Z. Risaldo & L. Lamphere ed. 1974).
54. Id. at 20-21. For example, consider the considerable prestige accorded to members
of exclusive all male private clubs, such as The Bohemian Club in San Francisco (whose
members include George Bush, Ronald Reagan and other presidents) and the expense these
clubs have undertaken to prevent women and minorities from gaining admittance.
55. ROSALDO, supra note 53, at 23. It was social theorist Frederick Engels who first
divided society into two spheres: the production of the means of existence with labor or
material reproduction, and the production of people with the family or human
reproduction. Cf. N. CHODOROW, MOTHERING, MALE DOMINANCE AND THE CASE FOR
SOCIALIST FEMINISM 84 (S. Eisenstein ed. 1979).
56. ROSALDO, supra note 53, at 23.
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organize, or subsume particular mother-child groups. "57 In other
words, the public sphere refers to the outside world controlled by men,
money and power.
Aside from the easily identifiable economic distinctions that
patriarchy creates in society, patriarchy has far-reaching ideological
underpinnings. Catharine MacKinnon, a law professor, argues that
patriarchy has created an all-controlling hierarchy between the sexes that
is determined by gender. 58 MacKinnon defines gender not as a
biological difference between the sexes, but rather as "an inequality of
power, a social status based on who is permitted to do what to
whom.,,59 Gender is about power and any attempt to define it as
difference, be it biological or psychological difference, is nothing but an
attempt to neutralize, rationalize, and cover the disparities of power. As
Professor MacKinnon so aptly puts it" [d]ifference is the velvet glove
on the iron fist of domination."60
The theoretical, and not so theoretical, effect of a patriarchal
hierarchy based on gender, and thus necessarily only two tiers, is that at
a very basic level of society the second tier is truly considered the
bottom rung. With only two choices-top or bottom-the dominant
gender is precariously close to falling among the other, the female sex.
Perhaps this is why heterosexual society scoffs so unjustly at male
homosexuals, because gay men have fallen among the females,
reminding "real men" where they too could end up if they become lax in
strutting their peacock feathers. This is not to argue that males in
general go around society making periodic checks on their dominance
just as the security guard makes his or her rounds to each checkpoint.
What it means is that despite a conscious decision in the 20th century to
elevate the status of the female gender in society, by granting women the
right to vote, by allowing the decriminalization of abortion, and by
paying lip service to equal pay for equal work, in reality patriarchy has
not allowed the status of the female gender to move very far up the
ladder. As women struggle to be considered the same and thus equal to
men, the man has become the measure of all things. 61 "[W]omen are
measured according to [their] correspondence with man, [their] equality
judged by their proximity to his measure [and their difference] judged
by [their] distance from his measure."62
57.Id.
58. c. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 8-9 (1987).
59. Id. at 8.
60.Id.
61. Id. at 34.
62.Id.
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The sickening blow is that society's strides toward a gender-neutral
standard, in fact, reflect nothing more than a renaming of the male
standard. 63 In renaming the "reasonable man" to be the "reasonable
person," society really has not fundamentally changed. By seeking to
redefine the standard, at best, women have successfully obtained for
men what few benefits women have had historically.64
In the legal arena, patriarchy is the hand that fans the fire. Few
would challenge the premise that law is a powerful force in our society.
Law is, after all, what creates and defines the United States' federal,
state, and local governments. The fact that the Declaration of
Independence, United States Constitution, and the numerous other
documents protected in the National Archive were created by men of
power and economic influence does not dispel the idea that "[l]aw is
powerful as both a symbol and a vehicle of male authority.'>65
"This power is based on an ideology of law and an ideology of
women which is supported by law. One function of ideology is to
mystify social reality and to block social change. Law functions as a
form of hegemonic ideology.,,66 Society's acceptance of statements of
law as reality reinforces the law as "a powerful ideological force of
social cohesion and stability."67 Thus, when the Honorable William J.
Fernandez stated on the record:
Ever since Pharaoh's [daughter] tried to seduce Moses, th[e]
courts have had this problem that they faced ad infinitum
throughout the centuries. I would suggest to you, ... that
sexual liaisons do not happen in a vacuum. They happen
because of inducements, blandishments, suggestions, and so
forth, and that this kind of conduct proceeds to sexual liaisons .
The reason that you have ... the number of evidence code
sections and penal code sections about not showing the unchaste
conduct of a female person is to protect the person that's raped,
somebody that doesn't know the perpetrator of the rape.
It's a different story when you have people that know each other
and have been acquainted with each other before the rape and
63.ld.
64.ld.
65. J. Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 83, 84
(1980).
66.ld.
67.ld.
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after the rape. You know, is it really a rape or is it one of those
liaisons of life that people seem to go through from time to time
ad infinitum and will continue to go through throughout history?
I'm afraid that we're going to have to hear about the
blandishments of opportUnity and fhe scent of sexual flavor that
a person may exude. One cannot hide behind the cloak of
[California Evidence code section] 1106 to prevent same. That
has been the law since Moses's time. 68
He was reinforcing on the record, through his position as a trial
judge and thus an icon of the law, the patriarchal tenet that good girls
deserving of protection by the law do not know their attackers. 69
The formulation of law into written ideas, principles, and
regulations further acts to propel the impact of law as an ideology.
"Freezing ideas and information in words makes it possible to assess
more coolly and rigorously the validity of an argument, ... thus,
'reinforcing a certain kind and measure of [increased] rationality.' "70
"The power of law as ideology is to ... distort social reality in the name
of tradition.,,71 The practical effect among judges, lawyers, and law
students is a nearly uncontrollable penchant to compare, twist, and
tweak the human experience in the "case at hand" until it matches "on all
fours" the example contained in the case law, thus distorting the original
recollection of the experience. This same effect can also be found
among legislators who seek not to distort the human experience to
conform to the law, but rather seek to conform the law to the experience
of their constituents. In so doing, legislators attempt to address the
needs that fall within the broadest range of normal experience.
Problems arise when practicality requires the legislators to whittle away
at what falls within the normal range, with the resulting effect that, as
defined by the law, society'S view of what is normal is also whittled
away. "Normal" becomes an ideal that inadequately reflects or fails
altogether to reflect reality.
Applied to women, the effect of law as ideology is to further distort
and mystify the reality of female capabilities and experiences thus
inhibiting social change.72 For example, despite the substantial number
of American women working in 1908, the United States Supreme Court
Record at 122-23, Questo (No. 573185) (emphasis added).
S. ESTRICH, supra note 34, at 1.
J. Rifkin, supra note 65, at 84 (citations omitted).
[d.
72. [d. at 86.

68.
69.
70.
71.

CONSENT AND PATRIARCHAL INFLUENCE

47

upheld a maximum work hours law which applied to women only.73
The Court rationalized that a woman's "physical structure and a proper
discharge of her maternal functions-having in view not merely her
own health, but the well being of the race, justify legislation to protect
her from the greed as well as the passion of man. "74
The power of law as ideology is further exemplified by resorting to
the courts in massive litigation efforts to enhance the status of women.
The reliance on litigation reflects a profound belief by society that law
affects social change. 75 As stated above, however, despite changes in
the law, the basic hierarchical structure between the genders does not
change, rendering any victory hollow in practicality.76 This is the
mainstay of the power of law in patriarchy. By its very framework the
law communicates societal issues "as questions of law, claims of right,
precedents and problems of constitutional interpretation. ,,77 In so doing
the effect is to obscure the underlying social issues which are at the root
of these claims. Tradition, at the same time, perpetuates the paradigm of
law as the symbol of male authority and a legitimate mechanism for
deciding societal conflicts. 78

IV.
The Patriarchal Voice and Its Inherent Conflict With Female
Moral Development
The problem with the paradigm of law as the symbol of male
authority is that it does not reflect female morality and assumes that male
and female morality are identical. In truth, however, male and female
morality are very different. "[W]omen have a 'sense' of existential
'connection' to other human life which men do not. That sense of
connection in turn entails a way of learning, a path of moral
development, an aesthetic sense, and a view of the world and of one's
place within it .... "79 In part because of women's ability to give
birth,80 "women are more nurturant, caring, loving and responsible to
73. /d. at 85.
74./d. quoting Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908).
75. Id. at 86.
76.Id.
77. Id. at 87.
78.Id.
79. R. West, jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 15 (1988) citing C.
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VorCE (1982).
80. This view is not universally held by all commentators. Cf R. West, supra note 79,
at 21-22.
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others than are men."81 Moreover, a woman's priority on nurturing
and caring fundamentally determines the moral terms within which
women construct social relations. 82 Women view the morality of their
actions against a standard of responsibility to others.
On the other hand, men do not share a sense of connection with
other human life83 and this creates a vastly different view of the world.
Men view their actions against a standard of rights and autonomy from
others. 84
The moral imperative ... [for] women is an injunction to care, a
responsibility to discern and alleviate the "real and recognizable
trouble" of this world. For men, the moral imperative appears
rather as an injunction to respect the rights of others and thus to
protect from interference the rights to life and self-fulfillment. 85
The effect of this distinction between the moral fiber of men and
women is to create an inherent conflict between the genders that
permeates their individual and collective existential and psychological
viewpoints. Women view their purpose and actions from the stance of
how they will affect others. Men, valuing autonomy, adopt a moral
stance in which they hold themselves apart from other human beings. 86
When male or female triers-of-fact determine whether, according to
the reasonable person standard, a woman was consenting to an act of
sexual intercourse, theoretically different analyses should take place.
Female jurors presumably would experience the plaintiff's actions
subjectively as a response to the defendant's actions and to the world in
general around her. Male jurors would adopt a more objective
observation of a man's "rights" and the plaintiff's reactions to those
rights, a truly "reasonable man" approach. In practice, however,
because law as an ideology promulgates patriarchal ideology, the trierof-fact only follows the male analysis and determines a woman's guilt
or innocence based upon male moral standards. This is true no matter
what the sex of the juror.
Thus, when a woman accuses a man of rape or some form of sexual
assault, she confronts not only her attacker, but the basic thread that
runs throughout a male-dominated society. Be it criminal or civil, when
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 18
C. GILLIGAN, supra note 79, at 100 (emphasis added).
R. West, supra note 79, at 18.
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a woman files her complaint, she attacks not only the moral integrity of
the individual male to be able to take what he wants, but also the
hierarchy between the two genders, calling into question the ability of
the male gender to maintain its dominance and control over the female
gender. As MacKinnon argues,
[A woman's] access to male power is not automatic as men's is;
we're not born and raised to it. We can aspire to it. Me, for
instance, standing up here talking to you-socially this is an
exercise of male power. It's hierarchical, it's dominant, it's
authoritative. You're listening, I'm talking; I'm active, you're
passive. I'm expressing myself; you're taking notes. Women
are supposed to be seen and not heard. 87
No wonder a woman who dares to accuse a man of nonconsenting
sexual intercourse or nonconsenting sexual touching is treated like no
other! She has challenged the basic premise of patriarchal ideology and
its underlying morality. Patriarchy reacts not unlike a cobra whose own
security has been threatened. The cobra rises up and bares its fangs to
its perceived aggressor ready to fight to the death.
When a woman challenges the male hierarchy and its morality she
challenges an ideology that goes back to the time of the Old Testament.
In the story of Genesis, where the creation of the sexes 88 and the
subsequent downfall of man at the hands of Eve is told,89 the
beginnings of patriarchal ideology are evident. 9o By virtue of woman's
derivative creation and the secondary character of her existence, woman
was justifiably considered naturally inferior and subordinate to man.
87. C. MACKINNON, supra note 58, at 52.
88. And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept: and he
took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof; And the rib, which
the Lord God had taken from man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the
man. And Adam said, This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: she
shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of Man.
Genesis 2:21-23 (King James).
89. And the man said, The woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of
the tree, and I did eat. And the Lord God said unto the woman, What is this that
thou hast done? And the woman said, The serpent beguiled me, and I did eat. ...
Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception;
in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy
husband, and he shall rule over thee. And unto Adam he said, Because thou has
harkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree, of which I
commanded thee, saying, Thou shalt not eat of it: cursed is the ground for thy
sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life.
Id.3:12-13,16-17.
90. The HISTORY OF IDEAS ON WOMEN 17 (R. Agonito ed. 1977).
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"Created out of man and for man, to relieve his loneliness and to help
him, woman is shown to be responsible for man's troubles, not the least
of which, is his loss of immortality."91
The thread of patriarchal ideology can also be seen in the New
Testament in Paul's epistle to the Corinthians where he states: "The
wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband."92 Paul
continues: "But I would have you know, that the head of every man is
Christ; and the head of woman is the man; and the head of Christ is
God.... 93 For the man is not of the woman; but the woman of the
man. Neither was the man created for the woman; but the woman for
the man. '>94 To the Ephesians, Paul stated his point directly:
Wives submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the
Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is
the head of the church: and He is the saviour of the body.
Therefore as the church is subject unto Christ, so let the wives
be to their own husbands in every thing.95
Given the deeply embedded historical origins of male dominance in
society, it is no wonder why a confrontation in the courtroom over rape
or sexual assault is so explosive and newsworthy. Every time a woman
confronts a man on the issue of whether she consented to his sexual
conduct she challenges his masculinity and morality and, hence, his
sense of being. According to Professor MacKinnon, aggression against
those with less power is experienced as sexual pleasure, an entitlement
to masculinity. "Sexual abuse works as a form of terror in creating and
maintaining [inequality between the genders].,,96 "Traditionally rape has
been viewed as an offense one male commits upon another-a matter of
abusing 'his woman. ">97 This rationale appears to have been abandoned
in favor of one that, in fact, characterizes rape as violence, an abuse
against all women by all men.
Typically, in today's society, rape is used as a coercive form of
control over the female, taking shape as fear. It is fear that keeps
women home at night, that keeps women from revealing sexual
harassment at work, and it is fear that keeps women from reporting rape
91.
92.
93.
94.

[d. at 18.
I Corinthians 7:4 (King James).
[d. at 11:3.
[d. at 7:8-9.
95. Ephesians 5:22-24 (King James).
96. C. MACKINNON, supra note 58, at 7.
97. K. MILLETT, supra note 50, at 61.
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and sexual assault to the authorities and subsequently bringing criminal
or civil charges.
When contemplating bringing charges against their attackers,
women fear the repercussions of their actions. These fears range from
questioning whether the defense counsel will put the victim on trial
(playing into many victims' misgivings that they somehow caused the
rape or assault), to fearing the attacker will return if he is acquitted. In
the case where a woman does file a complaint and the defendant raises
the consent defense, as most do, a woman's character will be brought
into question. The defense counsel will cross examine the victim within
the bounds of rape shield laws and as close to the outside of those laws
as he dares. In the end, the jury will examine all of the evidence and
determine whether they believe that the victim consented based on her
conduct, her words and actions during the attack, and her past
relationship, if any, with the defendant. If the victim did not dress or
react or act or speak or communicate in the way imagined by jurors as
they ponder how they indeed would dress and react and act or speak or
communicate in the same circumstances, then the jurors are likely to
acquit the defendant or return a judgment in his favor. 98

V.
The Effect of the Patriarchal Voice to Perpetuate Social
Myths
The result is predictable because the ideology of law and the
ideology of male patriarchy will control the trial proceedings so that the
force of law continues to propagate patriarchal myths in society.
Professor MacKinnon has said that perhaps the biggest problem with
silencing the patriarchal voice is that by its very nature we examine and
criticize patriarchy through its own framework. This is true particularly
in the area of the law. How can jurors begin to evaluate whether a rape
or assault victim has consented or properly (and emphatically)
communicated her lack of consent within any other framework than the
one provided by the reasonable man standard courtesy of patriarchal
ideology? The answer is they cannot.

98. For a disturbing account of criminal rape cases that were overturned on appeal
because the victims did not dress or respond in a manner thought reasonable to the
appellate court, see, e.g., MJ. Whitley, Appellate Review Of Sexual Assault Cases: Time
To Abandon The Special Standard, 1983 s. ILL. U. L.J. 435 (1983).
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To truly understand the culture of a foreign land, the visitor must
first be able to speak the language. Today's jurors, whether male or
female, know only one language and thus hear only one voice. They
hear the voice of patriarchal ideology, but they do not understand its
import into their deCision-making. They do not understand that when
they listen to a woman's testimony and cross-examination on how she
responded to being approached by a police officer in a hotel room with
her two sleeping children, they evaluate the legitimacy of her response
according to the morality of a male-dominated society that seeks to
control women with fear. Professor MacKinnon illustrates this point
with uncompromising clarity:
The crime of rape-- this is a legal and observed, not a subjective,
individual, or feminist definition-- is defined around penetration.
That seems to me a very male point of view on what it means to
be sexually violated. And it is exactly what heterosexuality as a
social institution is fixated around, the penetration of the penis
into the vagina. Rape is defined according to what men think
violates women, and that is the same as what they think of as the
sine quo non of sex. 99
Almost without exception, every bit of stimulus that has entered and
shaped the mind of each juror, the judge, the bailiff, the police officer,
even the lawyers is the product of a patriarchal ideology. To the vast
majority of people to whom this propaganda has never been exposed,
there is no other way to think or to be. As a product, patriarchal
ideology enjoys a success that agencies on Madison A venue can only
dream about.

VI.
A Proposal for the Adoption of a Reasonable Woman

Standard
The next question is, of course, what do we do about it, what can
we do about it? The obvious answer is to inject the feminist perspective
into both the ideology and practice of law. Whether we can successfully
do this is another story.
To inject the feminist perspective into the ideology of law means a
concerted effort on behalf of all feminists, both male and female, to raise
the collective consciousness of the insidious nature of patriarchal
99. C. MACKINNON, supra note 58, at 87 (emphasis added).
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ideology. One commentator has suggested actively employing the
narrative voice to redefine the articulation of the law,l00 often called the
Rule of Law, and thus redefine law as ideology.
Traditionally, application of the Rule of Law begins with an
interpretation of the law or a body of legal doctrine and derives from that
interpretation an account of justice. 101 Termed the "interpretist legal
theory," it has been criticized because by its method, "the legal text not
only reflects, but ... even defines, what justice requires and hence
what a person is. "102 It is a different version of the age-old question,
does life imitate art or does art imitate life? Interpretist theory is what
propels the ideal of the reasonable man: the law defines what is
reasonable, rather than reasonableness defining justice.
Narrative legal theory, on the other hand, allows the speaker's
experiences to define the Rule of Law. The speaker tells his or her
story, giving an account or description of how it/eels to be a human
being within a legal regime. From the speaker's account and the state of
nature, a Rule of Law is created that meets the demands of justice. 103
Law in effect becomes a storyteller that reflects true human experience.
It is an initial step to breaking down the masks and barriers held in place
by the law as ideology.
For victims of sexual assault confronting a consent defense, this
means adopting new jury instructions that require a victim to tell her
narrative on the witness stand, to spotlight her experience with an
emphasis on her feelings, observations, and thoughts at the time of the
assault and afterwards. Initially, the desired effect is to draw out of the
witness her story as to whether she consented, from which a reasonable
woman standard can be formulated. 104 Secondarily, the jury may then
take the victim's testimony and examine it to the extent that it reflects the
common morality of women with an attendant responsibility to other
human beings. The new jury instruction might read as follows: Based
on the complainant'S testimony as to her story leading up to and
including the act of sexual intercourse, as well as her personal feelings
100. R. West, supra note 79, at 62.
101. Id.
102./d.
103.Id. Arguably this is what judges do when they formulate a result and then find the
law to match their desired result.
104. Adoption of a reasonable woman standard has been criticized in Donovan &
Wildman, Is The Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective On Self-Defense And
Provocation, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 435 (1981). The authors rejected the reasonable woman
standard because other minority criminal defendants with unique socio-economic
characteristics would be equally excluded by adoption of a reasonable woman standard. Id.
at 436-37.
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and thoughts during intercourse and afterwards, you must decide
whether the complainant felt harmed by the intercourse and thus did not
consent, even if the harm does not look like the kind of violence
traditionally protected by the Rule of Law. As structured, this
instmction will compel the jurors to focus on specific aspects of the
victim's testimony, as well as maintain a perspective on her experience.
Moreover, by consciously avoiding a specific comparison to a
predetermined standard, the reasonableness of the victim's conduct is
elicited from her testimony such that the Rule of Law is defined by the
victim's narrative and the state of her circumstances.

VII.
Conclusion
Starlyn Watts' experience at trial makes clear that despite legislative
safeguards put in place to protect victims of sexual assault in criminal
and civil proceedings, the male voice, as the dominating speaker in
society, prevents the protection of victims from the stereotypical
prejudices against women propagated by male society. It is law as
ideology that further gives fuel to this voice as it allows reality to be
masked and inhibits social change. To unveil reality and effect social
change within the law, the patriarchal voice must be exposed as a potent
propaganda. Once unmasked, social change must still be put into
motion so that more than one voice may formulate the Rule of Law.
Only with exposure and the acceptance of a narrative legal theory so as
to give voice to the feminist perspective can the insidiousness of
patriarchy be appreciated and ultimately eradicated from society.

